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Since it is in the best interest of the public that they exercise their
functions zealously and fearlessly, they should not be unduly hampered or intimidated by the threat of legal action should they err.
The next question concerns the amount of immunity that should be
extended. It is submitted that a test of reasonableness should be
applied. In determining whether a public officer is to be held personally liable, the jury should decide whether the officer acted reasonably. The concept of reasonableness assumes that the officer has
acted in good faith and that there was substantial evidence warranting the course of action pursued. To adequately protect the private
citizen, the burden of proof should be on the officer to establish the
reasonableness of his act.
The suggestions made above do not amount to a panacea. The
many facets of every legal problem preclude the possibility of pat
solutions satisfactory to all interested parties. It is hoped, however,
that they will recommend themselves as a workable method of approach to the problem of the tort liability of administrative officers.

)X
THE RELGIOUS PROTECTION CLAUSES IN NEW YORK'S
CHILDREN'S COURT ACTS

At the turn of the century, a group of citizens in Illinois impressed upon the legislature of that state the need for a court for
children.' This legal and sociological development rapidly extended
to other states, so that today, a scant half-century later, most states
have separate courts for children.2 The idea was born of necessity.
Prior to that time, children who committed offenses were placed on
equal footing with adults,3 and were subjected to the same penalties
as more mature criminals. Since, however, criminal jurisprudence
includes the concept of rehabilitation, 4 and since impressionable children should be trained, guided and protected, special treatment and
consideration for such children is entirely warranted.
'See Neary, Selecting Clients for the Juvenile Court, YEARBOOK, NAT.
Children, however, were tried in a separate
PROBATION Ass'N 209 (1936).
session of the criminal court as early as 1863 in Massachusetts. 6 N.Y.
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION COMMITEE, PROBLEMS RELATING To BILL
There are indications that
OF RIGHTS AND GENERAL WELFARE 659 (1938).
sentences imposed upon children during the colonial period were not actually
carried out. KAHN, A COURT FOR CHILDREN 17 (1953); TEL-MrRS AND REINEMANN, THE CHALLENGE OF DELINQUENCY 69 (1950).
2See 6 N.Y. STATE CONSTITUrIONAL CONVENTION COMmITIEE, op. cit.
supra note 1; NEARY, op. cit. supra note 1.
3 See TEETERS AND REiNEMANN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 70.
4 See ROONEY, LAWLESSNESS, LAW AND SANCTION 40 et seq. (1937);
SNYDER, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 23 (1953).
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New York State adopted the concept of a court for children into
its constitution in 1921, 5 although in early years there had been a
Children's Court which existed as an adjunct of the Court of Special
Sessions. 6 In this state, children are now deemed incapable, with
certain exceptions, of committing crimes.7 Consequently, the Children's Courts of New York are not criminal courts,8 but rather, they
are instrumentalities through which delinquent or neglected children
are helped and protected and thus become useful members of society.
The courts which have jurisdiction over these children are two: the
Children's Part of the Domestic Relations Court of the City of New
York,9 territorial jurisdiction of which is limited to the city; and the
Children's Court,10 which is found in other counties of the state.
These courts, like children's courts of other jurisdictions, are designed to aid the child." It becomes necessary therefore, that in rehabilitating and protecting children under their jurisdiction, the courts
take care that all possible benefits be extended to them. The courts
should concern themselves not only with the physical and mental, but
also with the spiritual, welfare of the child. 12 In recognition of this
need, the New York State Constitution was amended to provide that
• .. whenever a child is committed to an institution or is placed in
the custody of any person by parole, placing out, adoption, or guardianship, it shall be so committed or placed, when practicable, to an
institution governed by persons, or in the custody of a person, of the
same religious persuasion as the child." 13 This mandate is implemented by both the Children's Court Act 14 and the New York City
5N.Y. CoNsr. Art. VI, § 18.
6 This court was established in 1902. The Children's Court became separate

and distinct from the criminal court system in 1924.
CONSTITUTIONAL

CONVENTION

COMMIrrE,

RIGHTS AND GENERAL WELFARE. 664
7 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 486. "The

PROBLEMS

See 6 N. Y.

RELATING To

(1938).

STATE

BILL

OF

word 'delinquent' shall include any child
over seven and under sixteen years of age (a) who violates any law of this
state or of the United States or any municipal ordinance or who commits
any act which if committed by an adult would be a crime, except any child
of fifteen years of age who commits an act which if committed by an adult
would be punishable by death or life imprisonment. ..."
8 N.Y. CHILD. CT. AcT § 45. "This act shall be construed to that end
that the care, custody and discipline of the children brought before the court
shall approximate as nearly as possible that which they should receive from

their parents, and that as far as practicable they shall be treated not as
criminals but as children in need of aid, encouragement and guidance." N.Y.
Dom. Ri. CT. Acr § 89. See also People v.Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 176, 177,

183 9N.E. 353, 354, 355 (1932), cert. denied, 289 U.S. 709 (1933).

Laws of N.Y. 1933, c.482.
20 Laws of N.Y. 1922, c.547.
12 See People v. Lewis, supra note 8; Goldsmith, Legal Evidence in the
New York Children's Courts, 3 BROOKLYN L. REv. 24 (1933).
22 Cf. American Bishops, The Child: Citizen of Two Worlds in OuR
BIsHOPS SEAK 164 (Huber ed. 1952).
13 N.Y. ColsT. Art. VI, § 18.
14 N.Y. CHLD. CT.AcT § 26.
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Other states have similar provi-

Placing of Child in Voluntary Institution
Where a child, who is neglected, dependent or delinquent, is
placed in the custody of an institution, that institution should be conducted, where practicable, by persons of the same religious persuasion
as that of the child. 17 The reasoning is that since the child is away
from his home, his religious faith should be protected with care and
diligence. In placing children in sectarian institutions, the state is
fully cooperating with religious bodies in rehabilitating these children.
The constitutional doctrine of separation of Church and State is not
infringed upon in these situations, because the purpose of the statute
permitting this placement is to promote the public welfare.' 8 The
child and the state alone are the beneficiaries. 10 Indeed, in Everson
v. Board of Education,20 which first defined this separation doctrine,
the Supreme Court stated that "[t] he fact that a state law, passed to
satisfy a public need, coincides with the personal desires of the individuals most directly affected is certainly an inadequate reason for
us to say that a legislature has erroneously appraised the public
need." 21 This cooperation between voluntary institutions under religious auspices and the state in rehabilitating and protecting children
indicates ".

.

. the religious nature of our people and accommodates

the public service to their spiritual needs." 22 Furthermore, the complete child-mind, body and soul-is cared for in such institutions.
N.Y. Dom. REL. CT. AcT § 88.
e.g., ALA. CoDE tit. 13, § 361 (1941); ARIZ. CoDE ANN. § 46-132
(Supp. 1951); ARK. STAT. § 45-229 (1947) ; DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 984, 1178
(1953); D.C. CODE tit. 11, § 11-918 (1951); ILL. REV. STAT. c. 23, §211 (1951);
25

16 See,

IND. STAT. ANN. § 9-3217 (Burns, Supp. 1953); IowA CoDE c. 232, § 23224
(1950); MINN. STAT. §260.20 (1949); Mo. REV. STAT. §211.140 (1949);
NEB. REv. STAT. §43-216 (1943); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 110-35 (1952);
Onxo REv. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 2151.32 (Baldwin, 1953) ; OKLA. STAT. tit. 20,

§ 824 (1951) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 252 (Purdon, 1939) ; R.I. GEN. LAWS
c. 616, § 12 (1938) ; VT. STAT. § 9899 (1947) ; VA. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 16-172.48
(Supp. 1952); Wyo. ComP. STAT. ANN. §58-610(2) (1945) (private homes
only).
The Connecticut statute permits clergymen of the various religions
to instruct children in public institutions. CONN. GEN. STAT. §2838 (1949).
17 See NAT.
PROBATION Ass'N, STANDARD JUVENILE COURT ACT § 19;
KAHN, A COURT FOR CHILDREN 108 (1953).
18 See Dunn v. Chicago Industrial School for Girls, 280 Ill. 613, 117 N.E.
735 (1917). In that case, the court sustained an appropriation of funds to a
Catholic institution. Young girls of the Catholic faith were committed there
by the Juvenile Court. The court, noting that the funds were used to educate
and care for the children, held that the constitutional prohibition against aiding
a particular religion was not contravened.
19 Cf. Cochran v. Louisiana State Board of Education, 281 U.S. 370 (1930)
(books of non-sectarian nature furnished to parochial schools).
20 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
21 Id. at 6.
22
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952).
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New York courts have given much weight to both constitutional
instituand statutory provisions regarding the placing of children in
tions conducted by persons of the same religious persuasion. 23 Some
states, on the other hand, in attempting to provide for rehabilitation
of children by means of "Youth Authorities" have repealed these religious protection clauses. 24 Even if these institutions provide chaplains, and conduct formal religious services, the25spiritual values which
aid in rehabilitating children are generally lost.
Probationof Child to Officer of Same Religious Faith
The Domestic Relations Court of the City of New York, alone of
all children's courts in the nation, 26 provides that, where practicable,
the probation officer shall be of the same religious faith as that of the
probationed child.27 It has been suggested that this provision prevents an efficient operation of the probation department.28 Assignment by religion of the child, it is urged, is wasteful since an officer
may be compelled to spend much of his time travelling to meet his
wards, and thus detracts from the time he may spend with them. A
corollary to this proposition is that frequently two probation officers
will visit the same neighborhood, because the children on probation
are of different faiths. Finally, it is suggested that capable officers
will treat all children equally, notwithstanding religious beliefs.
Geographical apportionment of cases, in essence, is propounded as the
most efficient method.
Many reasons suggest themselves as to why a probation officer
should be, if possible, of the same religion as that of the child. Probation is case-work. The success of this case-work depends upon a
close relationship between the officer and the child. The more factors
which are present to help weld this relationship, the greater is the
chance of success in rehabilitation and treatment. Cultural, linguistic
and religious ties are among those which help to achieve that result.
23 See Matter of Santos, 278 App. Div. 373, 107 N.Y.S.2d 543 (lst Dep't
1951), appeal dismissed, 304 N.Y. 483, 109 N.E.2d 71 (1952).
24 See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 199.160 (Baldwin, 1943), repealed by

Act of 1952, H 157 (Baldwin, Supp. 1953). See also CAT. WEL. & INST. CoDE
§1730 (Deering, 1952). In commitments to institutions other than the Youth
Authority, California's statute is similar to those of other states. CAL. Wan.
& INST. CODE § 552 (Deering, 1952).
25 "Paid chaplains are in all the institutions and consideration to difference
in religious faith is given. In general the services are formal and would
appear of no great spiritual value to the hungry individuals who attend."
Van Waters, Problems Presented to the Federal System of Justice by the
Child Offender in 2 REPORTS, NAT. Comm'N ox LAw OBsERvANCE AND EN-

78 (1931).
See KAHN, A CouRT ,oR CHiLDREN 300 (1953).
27 N.Y. Dom. REL. CT. Acr §§ 25, 88.
28
See KAHN, op. cit. supra note 26. Research, however, has not indicated

FORCETIENT
26

that the courts themselves feel that such assignment by religion detracts from
the efficiency of the probation department.
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While it is undoubtedly true that a probation officer of a different
faith can work efficiently with children, he may be less equipped to
understand and to interpret for the child who is seeking guidance, the
problems which are peculiar to the child's religious faith such as
dietary laws or attendance at church. Furthermore, where the probation officer is of another persuasion, he is at a disadvantage in explaining the meaning of the child's religion.
Not to be neglected in considering this problem are the parents
of the child. Those who profess a religious faith are more at ease
with a probation officer who is of the same religion, and thus, the
child's problems are more easily explored. Also, the probation officer
of the same faith as the child is undoubtedly more familiar with the
facilities his church offers for probationed children.
A more serious objection leveled against the practice of assigning
probation officers by religion is that such a practice might violate civil
rights. The argument is that since assignment of probation officers
is by religion, then hiring of them may depend upon their religion. 29
This, it is stated, may contravene the Civil Rights Clause of the New
York Constitution."°
This objection, however, appears unfounded. It is to be noted
that the two constitutional provisions are not inconsistent. One prevents discrimination on the basis of religion; the other requires that
where practicable, the probation officer be of the same religious faith
as the child. Neither provision is absolute, but each should be given
full effect. 3' The Civil Rights Clause expands 32 upon the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, 8 and its purpose is to prevent discrimination in hiring
solely on the basis of religion, race, color, or creed. The motivating
factor in hiring a probation officer of a particular religious faith and
rejecting another candidate is not because of his religious persuasion,
but because the public policy of this state, as set forth in its constitution, declares that where practicable, the officer shall be of the same
religious faith as the probationed child. Where the juvenile delinSee KAHN, op. cit. supra note 26.
30 N.Y. CoNsT. Art I, § 11. "No person shall be denied the equal protec29

tion of the laws of this state or any subdivision thereof. No person shall,
because of race, color, creed or religion, be subjected to any discrimination
in his civil rights by any other person or by any firm, corporation, or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision of the state." See also
N.Y. EXEcUTivE LAW § 296. The usual practice in New York City is to
hire probation officers for the Domestic Relations Court without regard to
religion. As needed, these officers are assigned cases in the Children's Part
according to religion; those remaining are assigned to the Family Part.
31 See People ex rel. Smith v. Board of Supervisors, 148 N.Y. 187, 190,
42 N.E. 592 (1896).
32 See 6 N.Y. STATE CONSTUTON . CONVENTION COMMITTEE, PROBLEMS
RELATING TO BILL OF RIGHTS AND GENERAL WLFRE 223 (1938).
33 U.S. CoNsT. AMEND. XIV, § 1. "... . nor [shall any state] deny to any

person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
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quency situation is as acute as it is in the nation today, this plan is
not only practicable, but also extremely propitious. Furthermore,
since the criterion is the child, and his welfare, and not the officer's
religion, there is no inhibition imposed by the Civil Rights Clause
since a legitimate public purpose may be served by reasonable means
without regard to the constitutional limitation of equal protection.3 4
Conclusion
The Legislature of the State of New York has appropriated
funds for a commission to study the organization of courts in this
state and to propose methods whereby the system might become more
efficient. 35 Especial attention is being given to the Domestic Relations Court which has jurisdiction over the fundamental basis of
society, the family, and the cornerstone of the society of the future,
the child. The need for a more efficacious method of treating family
problems has been demonstrated by several authorities.3 6 But in the
desire to cure existing defects in these courts, care must be taken to
preserve that part of the institution which is useful and conducive to
the best welfare of the child.
The Roman Catholic Bishops of the United States have emphasized the necessity of educating the child to be a useful and worthwhile citizen by including in his education respect for God, country,
and laws. 3 7 A fortiori, a delinquent or neglected child needs to be
taught respect for religious and moral principles, since these develop
in him a sense of responsibility.
Mr. Justice Hill, presiding justice of the Domestic Relations
Court, has remarked upon the need for religion in rehabilitating the
child:
No real character is built without the alloy of religion.
The mixing of this particular alloy in with human conduct
so that it will be accepted and used, and not rejected, is one
of the most delicate operations known to science-and it is a
science, a science of love and understanding, as any clergyman will tell you.
Religion cannot be forced down the throat. Authority
and punishment sour it. Necessarily, the judge is associated
with authority. He serves an essential purpose in bringing
back to shore the boy or girl who is swimming out to sea in
34 See People v. Arlen Service Stations, Inc., 284 N.Y. 340, 344, 31 N.E.2d
184, 185 (1940).
35 Laws of N.Y. 1953, c. 591.

36 See Gpr.LLHORN, CHILDREN

AND FAMILIES IN THE COURTS (1953)

; KAHN,

A COURT -oR CrnDREN (1953).
37 See American Bishops, The Child: Citizen of Two Worlds, in OuR
BIsHoPs SPEAx 164 (Huber ed. 1952).
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the face of a tempest. But, after the child is turned back
and landed on shore, the job is only half done. That child
must be convinced of the danger he incurs, and the task of
doing this is exceedingly difficult for one who had to use
force, so to speak, to rescue him against his will from the
waves.
A judge is suspect to this child who hates the adult
world. He represents the ultimate in authority and punishment to which most of our children are case-hardened by the
time they reach us.
It is just common sense that advice and leadership are
accepted only from those whom you respect and love. Probation officers, in time, are able to establish that rapportwith
the sick child which makes it possible for them to talk helpfully about character and spiritual values...
...

Religion should not be associated with punishment.

So this judge will not attempt to mix in the alloy of religion
at this inopportune moment. He will leave this important
task to the future when the child will be receptive to words
of wisdom imparted by someone whom the child has learned
to respect and accept.8s
It would seem, therefore, that probation officers of the same religious9 persuasion would be more effective than officers of another
faith.
The task of restoring these children is huge. Religion helps to
give them a proper sense of values. Since religion is an important
factor in the training and protection of the total welfare of the child,
the religious protection clause of the New York Constitution is instrumental in achieving this goal.

38 Cited in KAHN, op. cit. supra note 36, at 111 (emphasis added).
39 See COOLEY, PROBATION AND DELINQUENCY 14 (1927). Compare

NAT.
CONFERENCE ON PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF JUVENILE DELINQUENcY, RECoxMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 99 (1947);
TEETERS AND REINE ANN, THE
CHALLENGE OF DELINQUENCY 617, 618 (1950).

